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Comments
of the Internet Society
in regards to the
Department Of Commerce
National Telecommunications and Information Administration
15
CFR Chapter XXIII
[Docket No. 980212036-8036-01]
Improvement of Technical Management
of Internet Names and Addresses
("Green Paper")
17 March 1998
I. Introduction
The Internet Society
(ISOC) wishes to thank the members of the team that produced the referenced
document ("Green Paper") for their diligent effort against a
formidable time constraint; and, for bringing forward several of the issues
that are critical to the continued evolution of the Internet. We are confident
that an international open process with no undue influence from any one
entity to discuss and resolve these issues will result in conclusions
and actions for the best interests of the Internet.
II. Executive
Summary
The development and
evolution of the Internet has been in process for a number of years. In
all those years, it has employed principles of self-governance, out of
which has emerged the concept of "rough consensus." Rough consensus
is reached through a rigorous, openly vetted process that produces the
best of alternatives; it does not mean unanimity, but it does mean broad
based acceptance. Cooperation amongst the Internet stakeholders produces
rough consensus and has brought the Internet to its present successful
and robust state. The Internet Society encourages the continuance of this
proven concept.
There are several
key issues presented in the Green Paper for which ISOC has special concern
or interest:
Central
Authority - The Internet Society supports the concept of a central
authority for the management and administration of: Internet address space,
other protocol conventions essential to the use and operation of the Internet,
domain names, and the root server system. We note the similarity between
the proposal in the Green Paper for this central authority, and that proposed
by Dr. Jon Postel of IANA http://www.iana.org/iana/iana-plan-980113.txt
as developed through the normal process of consensus building which
has been employed for the many years of Internet evolution.
The Internet Society
expresses support for the proposal of Dr. Postel, and believes there are
common grounds upon which these two proposals can coalesce. We believe
it would be beneficial to the continued health of the Internet for rough
consensus to result on this issue and we encourage all interested parties
to commit to supporting the concept.
Registries - A
registry is the database repository for one or more gTLDs. A registry
is a monopoly. This is an unfortunate fact that exists, at least for now,
due to technical limitations. As a result, a registry must operate under
different guidelines than a normal business. The potential for abuse through
price gouging, once registrants become "locked in" to the gTLD
through the proliferation of its URLs, is significant.
Because of its unique
situation, the registry function is a service function for the Internet
and should be administered on a non-profit basis utilizing shared database
technology. This allows multiple registrars to access and utilize the
databases in the exercise of registering second level domain names. There
should be no "ownership" of gTLDs, and they should be treated
as an international resource, subject to the public trust.
There is no particular
reason why there couldnt be multiple registries scattered throughout
the world, each with a set of gTLDs having a shared database system with
multiple registrars.
Registrars - True
competition in the registration of domain names resides at the point where
the user, or registrant, - the entity who ultimately requests the registration
of a domain name - meets the Internet Domain Name System (DNS). That point
is clearly the registrar function. Registrars may be located anywhere
in the world; are independent businesses each competing for registrant
business on the basis of price and value added service; and use the registries
as a clearinghouse for assuring uniqueness in domain names. The registrar
may certainly be a for-profit entity.
Dispute Resolution
- As a result of the work of the International Ad Hoc Committee (IAHC)
and the continuing efforts of the many Internet stakeholders working with
the POC/CORE/PAB, a truly remarkable set of instruments to facilitate
the resolution of intellectual property disputes, efficiently, effectively,
and inexpensively has evolved. ISOC strongly supports this capability
and urges international recognition and acceptance of its offerings as
an option for resolving intellectual property disputes.
Governance - The
Internet Society asserts its strong belief that if the Internet is ever
to reach its fullest potential, it will require self-governance. If any
one entity attempts to control or govern the Internet, it is likely others
would protest. It then follows: if consensus is not reached, the Internet
could very well become fragmented and, accordingly, cease to exist as
we now know it. While we find much in the Green Paper with which we agree,
its attempt to define details that would be better left to the process
of bottom-up consensus building, appears to go against the principle of
self-governance. The US government would be well-advised to leave the
details such as: how many registries, for-profit or non-profit; the number
of gTLDs; the number of gTLDs per registry; to be defined in a self-determination
process such as that described in the History section.
In the formation of
the new IANA, the Green Paper calls for the creation of a new organization
to represent the Internet user community. ISOC believes itself to be more
representative than any other organization existing today. Equally important,
it is composed of, and represents, a veritable whos who of the Internet.
Regarding the broader issue of governance, while IANA has been funded
by the US government, it is chartered by the Internet Society through
the Internet Architecture Board (IAB) in RFC 1601 http://info.internet.isi.edu:80/in-notes/rfc/files/rfc1601.txt.
While it has accepted US government funding, it has nevertheless
operated without other US government involvement or intervention for many
years. ISOCs stewardship in this matter is a matter of public record
representing a shining example of responsibility in fostering Internet
self-governance. As with the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), IAB,
and the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG), autonomy of operation
is preserved.
Finally, ISOC believes
it would be prudent for all stakeholders to agree to proceed under the
authority of the current IANA, with the plan presented by the POC/CORE
system. This does not preclude other systems which would conform to requirements
established by IANA from being implemented, but consistency should be
maintained. This action would be consistent with the aims of the Green
Paper and provides a robust means to gain controlled experience along
the lines proposed in the Green Paper.
III. History
There may be arguments
about how old the Internet is, but certainly during the 1990s, the Internet
has incurred tremendous growth and transformation. It has emerged from
the academic and government environment, primarily within the United States,
to a truly international network of tens of thousands of interconnected
independent networks. It works because these networks cooperate; they
agree to use standards, such as the TCP/IP protocol. The standards were
developed through a grass-roots, or bottom-up process in an open forum
where only the best ideas emerge.
The Internet reached
its present robust state for many reasons: a brilliant protocol; an early
founding period wherein the participants were virtually unnoticed; an
environment extremely conducive to cooperation among and between the participants;
the freedom to experiment in an uncontrolled environment; an open forum
using a grass roots approach to standards development; indeed, a self-regulating
and self-policing culture. It was from this background that the concept
of "rough consensus" emerged. Rough consensus is actually derived
through a very rigorous process that weeds out the weak proposals and
encourages the best. It does not mean unanimity, but it does mean broad-based
acceptance. This is the mode of operation for the IETF, the dominant standards
body for the Internet.
Take away cooperation,
and the dynamic, innovative Internet that we have come to know and admire
will go away.
In the tradition of
what made the Internet the phenomenal success that most agree it is today,
the Internet Society, in response to a proposal by the IANA, initiated
a process to enhance the Internet Domain Name System through the introduction
of competition and an efficient, effective, and inexpensive system for
dispute resolution between domain names and intellectual property owners.
A committee was formed, the IAHC, with its members coming from a broad
geographical spectrum as well as international, technical, business, and
legal perspectives. Employing all the techniques learned from the history
of the development of the Internet, the IAHC produced a plan which defined
a structure and processes to achieve precisely what the Green Paper proposes
to accomplish regarding domain names.
The IAHC plan, now
known as the CORE/POC/PAB, or gTLD-MoU plan, is and has been open for
modification and adaptation. It presents an excellent foundation from
which cooperative effort, with the US government as one of the participants,
could result in an international solution to the issues addressed in the
Green Paper. It has the added benefit of having been produced in the traditions
of the Internet and would be enhanced by wider participation as herein
suggested.
IV. The Critical Issues
Among the most
critical issues discussed in the Green Paper are:
- The concept of
a Central Authority for the administration of Internet Protocol
(IP) addresses and parameters, domain names, and the root server system;
- The concepts
of Registries; whether they be for-profit or non-profit; "ownership"
of gTLDs by registries; and, the use of shared database systems;
- The concept of
competitive Registrars;
- Dispute Resolution
mechanisms between domain name holders and intellectual property owners;
- The direct and
implied issues of Internet Governance.
A. Central Authority
(The New IANA)
The Internet
Society expresses its support of the document http://www.iana.org/iana/iana-plan-980113.txt
written by Dr. Jon Postel and as evolved through an international vetting
process. We believe it is similar enough to that proposed in the Green
Paper to warrant consideration as a basis upon which to arrive at strong
international consensus.
ISOC does not believe
it is necessary for the Green Paper to attempt to define the specifics
of board makeup for the new IANA and that the board makeup should be
determined through public discussion, electronic forum, and other iterative
mechanisms to arrive at an acceptable resolution. The IETF has a long
and successful track record of resolving complex and difficult issues
through this kind of process and these deliberative processes can be
used as a role model.
As the new IANA
relates to TLDs, registries, and registrars, the Internet Society offers
the following observations which have recently been discussed within
the IAB and the IESG:
- All TLDs, generic
and country-code based, should derive their authorization and existence
from the new IANA. The general rules of RFC 1591 <ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc1591.txt>
would apply.
- The special gTLDs
of .mil and .gov should be treated, for historical reasons, as additional
country code TLDs for the USA.
- For generic TLDs,
the IANA board would designate either one registry with responsibility
for all gTLDs or several registries, each with responsibility for
one or more gTLDs. The designation process would involve proposals
and competition; the registries would be operated as non-profits clearly
separated from any other components of the same organization; title
to the data and databases would clearly remain with IANA (the registry
would obtain no equity interest in the databases by consequence of
assembling, holding, or operating them); and, the IANA contracts with
registries would contain provisions for appeals, frequent review of
registry operations, auditing and testing of ability to transition
to other registry operators, and early termination of contracts for
not operating the registry efficiently or in accord with the public
interest. IANA should be able to require performance bonds and/or
other mechanisms for ensuring appropriate behavior both during registry
operations and in the transition from one registry to another.
- In general and
in the long term, economies of scale are likely to tend toward a single
registry, operated as above, for all or most gTLDs. However, this
is not a requirement; the IANA board may make other decisions and
arrangements. For a short transition period (see vii., below), it
is likely that the registry for the existing gTLDs would be different
from that for new ones.
- In general, all
authorized registrars would be permitted to make registrations in
all gTLDs, and it would be a contractual requirement on registries
to accept such registrations. Final review of qualifications for registrars
(and appeal from any delegated system) would rest with IANA and not
with the registry. However, the IANA board may accept proposals for
specific gTLDs with different rules about candidates for registration
and registrars; as with any other gTLD, IANA shall designate an appropriate
registry.
- The operation
of the root domain and corresponding servers and supporting services
is, as outlined in the GP, an IANA responsibility. Should IANA choose
to delegate day-to-day operational responsibility to an organization
with registry or registrar responsibilities, sufficient contractual
and organizational boundaries would be required to avoid any plausible
possibility of abuse of the relationship.
- For a transition
period and in order to facilitate that transition, the US government
is encouraged to contract with a qualified organization for the registry
operation of any existing gTLDs (e.g. .edu, .gov) not handled elsewhere.
Such a transitional contract should be short, should explicitly recognize
IANAs oversight authority, and should contain the general provisions
outlined above (specifically, non profit, public trust assumptions,
IANA ownership of data, IANA appeal and audit, clear separation from
any organization in the registry or root operations business - noting
that several of these provisions are slight refinements on those proposed
in the Green Paper).
- In order to support
the speedy transition that is generally agreed to be preferable to
a long and extended process, the qualifications for registrars established
in the gTLD-MoU should be taken as a starting point. The existing
registrars authorized by that process should be recognized conditioned
upon immediate re-opening of the application and acceptance process.
Once the IANA board is established it may supplement those criteria,
or, as suggested above, establish different criteria for new gTLDs
as needed.
B. Registries
Principal stewardship
for the gTLDs and related data will be seated in the new IANA which
will authorize registries as executors of this international public
trust. The registries do not own any of the data, any more than Trust
Officers at banks "own" the assets they steward, or neonatal
ICU nurses "own" the babies for whom they care. The fact that
those professional stewards do not "own" the objects in their
care does not at all diminish their moral and legal obligations to execute
their charge to the best of their ability and with all due diligence.
Further, the execution of that trust gives them no long-term claim on
the objects in their care. They may be life-critical but are nonetheless
transient caretakers.
The registries collect,
manage, and keep safe, a data corpus which is the fundamental glue of
the Internet, and their job is to ensure the accuracy and high availability
of the data entrusted to their care.
It is the explicit,
direct responsibility of the new IANA to execute this international
public trust. In doing so, it may elect to delegate the operational
execution of this trust to registries; but, the ultimate responsibility
for the execution of that public trust cannot be delegated. To this
end, the new IANA must maintain an absolute ability to secure the timely
and accurate execution of that public trust, including the removal and
reassignment of a registry.
Serving as a registry
is a task of significant gravity and responsibility which must be executed
with supreme professionalism and attention to the sole charge of the
public trust: the safe and accurate stewardship of the data. Organizations
who imagine serving as a registry should think hard about what they
are signing up to do. This is serious, world-class, public trust computing
where failures can not be tolerated.
Registries are not
meant to compete, although having multiple registries throughout the
world would not necessarily be undesirable. Certainly registries must
conform to minimum standards of operation such as hours of operation,
maximum turn around time for registration, etc., but their customers
are the registrars and not the end user, or registrant. When one first
registers under a gTLD, they pick the gTLD depending upon what most
fits what they are trying to project. Thereafter, they will rarely change
their gTLD, but may find it highly desirable to change registrars.
The ability
to change registrars, which gives a degree of "portability"
to a domain name holder, requires that registries utilize a shared database
capability that assures uniqueness in the registration of domain names.
As long as all registries have a shared database capability conforming
to the requirements of the DNS, multiple registries could exist.
As the repository
for the database for each gTLD under its stewardship, the registry is,
in fact, a monopoly for each of the gTLDs it services. As such it must
operate under a different set of rules than a normal for profit business.
If a registry
could be "for profit" based, there is the risk of significant
price gouging, once a domain name is registered. The nature of the Internet
is such that domain names become embedded in countless URLs and other
forms of notice. They get linked in cascading fashions which make it
extremely difficult to change, once released. The switching cost, therefore,
could become quite high and, thus, a for-profit registry could take
advantage of that plight by raising prices significantly.
We recognize that
there are significant costs associated with maintaining and operating
a registry, but we also know that those costs can be identified and
pricing to registrars can be established based upon those costs. Accordingly,
it is clearly desirable that registries be non-profit, with a cost-based
pricing mechanism to its customers - the registrars.
C. Registrars
Registrars are
the interface between the end user, or registrant, and the Internet
DNS. It is here where true competition that benefits the user community
will be beneficial. With multiple registrars operating worldwide under
a shared registry system, consumers have the ability to pick which registrar
best fits their needs, whether that is based upon price, quality of
service, language capabilities, hours of operation, convenience of registration,
etc. The registrant is not confined to any particular registrar because
each registrar can register domain names under the same gTLDs.
However, even in
a system where there are multiple registries, it is possible that a
registrant may be compelled to deal with multiple registrars if the
gTLDs employed by the registrant are housed in different registries,
and the registrar is not affiliated with the designated registry. Given
that registries are a service to the Internet, and specifically to the
registrars as a public trust, this concept would seem to strengthen
the case for one registry.
ISOC does not
take a position on whether there should be one master registry, or multiple
registries; only, that if there are multiple registries, they must have
shared database systems with multiple registrar capabilities and be
non-profit oriented.
D. Dispute Resolution
The Green Paper
does not define a specific methodology for the resolution of disputes
between intellectual property owners and domain names, but suggests
certain minimum standards. This is superficially appealing but is likely
to increase the confusion in an already complex legal arena. Owners
of global trademarks and major brand names are already protesting the
complexity of dealing with national law differences and differences
between various administrative systems for handling trademark-domain
name disputes. The Internet Society strongly encourages the US government
to look seriously at the results of the consensus building effort of
the IAHC/POC/CORE/PAB - gTLD-MoU process that developed the dispute
resolution mechanisms in conjunction with the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO).
There is a robust
set of procedures to efficiently, effectively, and inexpensively resolve
disputes between domain name holders and intellectual property owners
in the form of online expedited mediation, online arbitration, and Administrative
Challenge Panels (ACPs) to allow preemptive prevention of the use of
internationally famous trade marks in domain names by other than the
rightful owner. More specific and detailed information can be found
at the gTLD-MoU web site at http://www.gtld-mou.org/,
or directly to the dispute resolution section at http://www.gtld-mou.org/#dispute.
The proposal
in the Green Paper to let "each name registry" establish its
own dispute resolution policy will introduce confusion and perhaps chaos
into an already complex issue, and such a system might unduly favor
one region compared to others. ISOC strongly encourages the US government
to remove that proposal from the Green Paper. Instead, the Green Paper
should contain a recommendation to adopt a specific, existing methodology
for dispute resolution such as that referenced in the gTLD-MoU, as a
basis upon which to begin. Allowing each registry to establish its own
dispute resolution policy will create a situation where one of the criteria
for the selection of a registry by a customer could be the type of dispute
settlement to which the customer will be subject. This could, in turn,
create a strong incentive for each registry to adopt a dispute policy
that maximizes its business, namely a policy that is exclusively domain-name-owner-friendly,
and trademark-owner-unfriendly, rather than adopting an effective policy
that will intelligently balance interests and maintain a stable commercial
Internet space for global electronic commerce.
The gTLD-MoU
dispute resolution mechanisms do not impede or otherwise preempt or
override national laws or court systems and always allow for participants
to revert to those national systems at any time. Indeed, the procedures
fit very well the criteria defined in the Green Paper for desirable
systems and were developed by a wide body of legal experts, business
interests, trademark experts, domain name holders, and interested parties
of varying backgrounds, from around the entire world. The resultant
system is a comprehensive and robust tool for Internet stakeholder use!
We recognize that, beyond national court systems, there are other established
and proven dispute mechanisms available.
E. Governance
As stated in
the Introduction section of this document, the Internet Society is strongly
supportive of the US governments desire to withdraw from any direct
involvement in the development, operation, or management of the Internet.
We have a concern that the Green Paper leaves the door open for continuing
controlling involvement by the US government in the regulation of the
Internet for as much as two years. That time period could be significantly
reduced by the US governments support of, and participation in,
the continually evolving gTLD-MoU, which resulted from the one-and-a-half
years of consensus building within the international Internet industry.
We are similarly
supportive of the US government proposal to assist in the creation of
a new IANA that is non-profit and governed by a policy oversight board
which must be open, transparent and accountable to Internet participants.
We are compelled to point out that an effort to reinvent IANA has been
underway for some time as a result of the anticipation that US government
funding of the existing IANA would cease in the fall of this year. In
keeping with the processes by which the Internet has reached its present
robust state, that is, bottom-up consensus building, a proposal has
been evolving that was written by Dr. Jon Postel, the current head of
IANA. The most recent iteration of that proposal can be found at http://www.iana.org/iana/iana-plan-980113.txt.
ISOC recommends
the involvement of the US government, as one voice among many, in the
evolution of the Postel proposal and points out that it is similar to
that proposed in the Green Paper. We believe that most Internet stakeholders
would be eager to rally around a combined effort consolidating these
plans and resolving any differences. This could be done fairly quickly
via electronic forum and any appropriate public meeting forum.
While the US government
has funded IANA for many years, it has not interfered in the operation
of the organization nor in the decisions IANA has made. IANA has a sterling
track record of responsible operation and is recognized for its impartial,
fair, and consensus building methods in executing its responsibilities.
Further, IANA has operated under the auspices of the Internet Society,
in a fully autonomous mode consistent with the IAB, IESG, and IETF,
as noted in RFC 1601 http://info.internet.isi.edu:80/in-notes/rfc/files/rfc1601.txt.
While we dont
believe that it is necessary to wait until the new IANA has been duly
constituted in order to begin adding new gTLDs to the root servers,
we do believe that the definition of gTLDs, registries, numbers of gTLDs,
and like detail should not be defined by the US government, nor by any
one institution. This is counter to the principle of self-governance,
for which the US government has so often expressed support. Once the
new IANA has been created, its processes will be in the best position
to make those determinations.
We do not see a
need for the creation of a new membership association. The Internet
Society has existed for approximately six years. It is more representative
of the Internet user than any other organization. Any individual or
organizational entities are completely welcome to join. We are open
to new members, and democratically run. ISOC has a Board of Trustees
elected by the world-wide individual members. It has a set of bylaws
http://www.isoc.org/isoc/general/trustees/bylaws.shtml,
a set of written rules and operating procedures, and (most importantly)
a history of democratic operations. In addition to having thousands
of individual members from over 150 countries, ISOCs over 140
Organization members make up a veritable whos who of the Internet.
ISOC is also the organizational home of the democratically run IETF,
IAB, IESG, and Internet Research Task Force (IRTF) - the standards setting
and research arms of the Internet community with bottom-up consensus
building through thousands of participants. ISOC has demonstrated leadership
in many areas, including organizing the effort to introduce competition
into the DNS, one that has garnered more industry support than has any
other proposal.
V. Conclusion
Fortunately, the USG
is not looking for industry unanimity in how the Internet should be governed,
because unanimity is not likely to happen. If it is willing to accept
rough consensus, then it should look towards the gTLD-MoU plan as the
role model. That plan, which created POC/CORE, resulted from a robust
process that was thoroughly vetted in multiple public forums, and was
more publicly scrutinized than any issue ever introduced into the Internet.
The gTLD-MoU has more than 200 signatories (there were 217 as of 24 February
1998; the list continues to grow) and there are currently 88 registrars
established. CORE has plans soon to open the application process for registrars
and 22 new potential registrars have already indicated their intent to
apply.
Those who could not,
under the gTLD-MoU plan, carve out a piece of the Internet to call their
own will never agree to true competition that leaves the end-users in
the drivers seat. But who should the US government look to benefit,
if not the end-users? It is not the role of the US government to protect
the vested interests of those who would turn the Internet into their private
profit generator. Rather, the US government should support industry efforts
such as the gTLD-MoU, to transition to true industry self-governance.
We are in full agreement
with the stated goal of the US government: " . . . to seek as strong
a consensus as possible so that a new, open, and accountable system can
emerge that is legitimate in the eyes of all Internet stakeholders."
We submit that to ignore the efforts of major Internet stakeholders, in
the form of the gTLD-MoU plan, does not lend itself to attaining a strong
consensus.
We agree that the
US government should not " . . .cede authority to any particular
commercial interest or any specific coalition of interest groups."
However, we caution that the proposed new membership associations, while
in the process of evolving, may wind up controlled by a handful parochial
interests. We submit that the existing user and registrar groups (ISOC
and CORE) should be assisted and strengthened.
Concerns have been
raised about anti-trust litigation. We suggest that the US government
in cooperation with other governments, quickly draft anti-trust assurances
that will support industry self-governance supporting the will of the
world-wide Internet community.
We believe it would
be instructive and beneficial for the entire process to proceed, under
the current IANA, with the introduction of the POC/CORE system. Specifically,
this would mean the introduction of new gTLDs into the root servers, the
implementation of the already developed and tested shared registry system
of CORE, and the use of the now existing dispute resolution procedures
developed in the gTLD-MoU process. We recognize the possibility that other
systems which would conform to the requirements of IANA may emerge and
this action would not preclude their implementation. We simply believe
this step would provide a robust means to gain controlled experience along
the lines proposed in the Green Paper.
Contact Information:
Internet Society
Donald M. Heath
President/CEO
12020 Sunrise Valley Drive
Suite 210
Reston, VA 20191-3429
TEL: +703 648 98 88
FAX: +703 648 98 87
EMAIL: info@isoc.org
http://www.isoc.org/
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